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Abstract 
In this article, I address epistemological questions regarding the status of 
linguistic rules and the pervasive––though seldom discussed––tension that 
arises between theory-driven object perception by linguists on the one hand, 
and ordinary speakers’ possible intuitive knowledge on the other hand. 
Several issues will be discussed using examples from French verb 
morphology, based on the 6500 verbs from Le Petit Robert dictionary (2013). 
1. Introduction 
A journalist commenting on French actress Juliette Binoche’s performance 
declared on the radio “elle est insupportable, elle ne joue pas elle binoche” 
(she is unbearable, she does not act, she “binoches”). Undoubtedly, any 
French native speaker can spontaneously produce the whole morphological 
paradigm of this brand new verb, and for instance add /ʁa/ to this Pr31 /binɔʃ/ 
in order to form Fut3 /binɔʃʁa/. But what is the status of this “rule”? 
In this article, I will mainly raise epistemological questions regarding the 
tension between scientific expectations while analyzing French verb 
inflectional morphological rules on the one hand and ordinary speakers’ 
possible inflectional production rules on the other. 
                                                        
1 Tenses are abbreviated as Pr(esent), Imp(erfect), Fut(ure), Inf(initive), P(assé) 
S(imple), P(ast) P(articiple). Persons follow the conventional I to they order from 1 to 
6. Thus, Pr1-3 indicates Present singular. 
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2. Some epistemological issues about explanations and 
descriptions 
2.1. Linguistics as a science: a brief overview of some of the constraints 
As scientists, linguists aim at proposing coherent, exhaustive, predictive and 
ideally thorough, clear and simple2 theories3 (Allan 2003 ; Lerot 1993: 22-
23), while also mostly implicitly “put[ting] a high value on elegance and 
generality” (Wolpert 1993: 18) (see also Guillaume 1973: 84). According to 
Soutet (1995: 190) (see also Martin 2002: 68-69 ; Thagard 2008: 471-475), to 
be coherent, a theory may “not include two contradictory statements,” if it 
does, then: 
L'exigence – difficile à satisfaire – de cohérence conduit le linguiste à se 
confronter au couple de la règle et de l'exception. […] De deux choses l'une alors: 
ou bien on estime que ce conflit est dans l'objet lui-même, ce qui revient à 
considérer que, dans le domaine considéré, coexistent des propriétés 
contradictoires; ou bien on postule l'objet homogène et l'on est alors conduit à 
considérer que la contradiction résulte d'une perception fautive ou, à tout le moins, 
lacunaire de l'objet. (Soutet 1995: 191) 
Underlying Soutet’s stance toward the object lays a strong implicit postulate, 
namely that language should be regarded as homogeneous (for a discussion 
about language homogeneity from two different perspectives, see Croft 2000: 
90ff ; Milner 1989: 639ff), as clearly stated by Saussure (De) (1916/1959: 
15) “Whereas speech is heterogeneous, language […] is homogeneous.” Is 
language intrinsically homogeneous? Or does the very idea of homogeneity 
result from the linguists’ endeavor to provide coherent and exhaustive 
descriptions4, hence highlighting the rules that work while downplaying the 
possible epistemological significance of exceptions? Do rules reflect actual 
regularities in the language? 
                                                        
2 As Hurford (1977: 574) puts it “Science seeks to discover as much lawfulness as 
possible in the universe––but, paradoxically, to formulate as few laws as possible, 
since its lawmaking propensities are strictly curbed by the requirement that theories 
be maximally simple.” 
3 By theory, I mean: a provisional intellectual model of a humanly perceivable part of 
the universe, consisting of interrelated and partly conjectural propositions seeking to 
accurately describe, explain, and predict observed regularities in the part of the 
universe under investigation. 
4 Biases might also arise from data collection “since the documentation does not 
repeat the documented reality itself, but only represents a sample of it, there is 
necessarily a process of selection, which in itself is not objective and which, in fact, 
can be highly tendentious.” (Lehmann 2001: 87-88). 
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2.2. Do rules always exist? 
‘Well, I don’t go all the way with the neuroscientists. OK, the 
mind is a machine, but a virtual machine. A system of 
systems.’ 
‘Perhaps it isn’t a system at all.’ 
‘Oh, but it is. Everything in the universe is. If you are a 
scientist you have to start from that assumption’. 
Lodge, David (2001), Thinks 
If, as mentioned in the introduction, a French native speaker can effortlessly 
produce all the forms belonging to the verb paradigm of the absolute 
neologism /binɔʃ/, some kind of “rule” leading to these new forms has to 
exist (see Morin 1987: 14). But what is a “rule”? According to Kiefer (2000: 
297), “a grammatical rule is any statement expressing a linguistically 
significant generalization about the grammatical facts of a particular 
language” (see also Fradin 2003: 306). As the term “statement” clearly 
suggests, such “a given generalization […] can only acquire significance in 
relation to a particular linguistic theory” (Berg 1998: 2). The problem is then 
to determine whether rules are mere “statements about actual linguistic 
behavior” (Trask 1999/2007: 248) proposed by linguists and inherently 
bound to specific––and often incompatible––theoretical models, or actually 
reflect a real “linguistic behavior”, which ordinary speakers rely on to 
produce grammatical sentences. To what extent do rules actually organize 
language? Let us consider the tension between the theory (“meta-level”) and 
the object (“object-level”5). 
As a first approximation, I will consider the four possible configurations of 
Table 1, making the linguists’ endeavor to formulate rules either a dead end 
or a possible achievement. Intrinsic rules (IR) represent the rules assumed to 
exist in the language itself––no matter whether linguists can find them or 
not––, and proposed rules (PR) the ones formulated by linguists. The 
following table presents the four possibilities of existing (1) or non-existing 
(0) rules on either side: 
                                                        
5 These two terms are borrowed from Lehmann (2001: 89, table 2). The word “object” 
is by itself already theory-dependent, since “it is the viewpoint that creates the object” 
(Saussure (De) 1916/1959: 8). 
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 IR PR 
I 0 0 
II 0 1 
III 1 1 
IV 1 0 
Table 1 – Theoretical approaches to rules 
Any scientist would normally discard I and IV, since her responsibility and 
duty––which justifies her social status––is precisely to discover regularities 
and formulate rules. In I, denying the very existence of intrinsic rules in 
language would just make this scientific quest irrelevant (however, see 2.4). 
Moreover, as native speakers of at least one language, linguists––no matter 
their epistemological stance toward their object––have to spontaneously 
acknowledge that some “device” allows languages to be learned, and 
previously unknown grammatical forms to be accurately produced. These 
two reasons suffice to acknowledge the existence of rules, and hence regard 
IV as a scientific failure. 
Now what about II and III? III obviously represents the ideal scientific 
situation. Nonetheless, there is no guarantee that the rules proposed by the 
linguist actually reflect the intrinsic rules of the language investigated. As to 
configuration II, one might want to definitely reject it on the ground that––as 
argued above––intrinsic rules must exist if language learnability and 
productivity are to be explained. However, claiming that rules exist in a 
language is not an all-or-nothing issue. There might be some parts of the 
language that obey rules while others do not, although this latter state of 
affairs does not preclude linguists from positing the existence of rules6. 
Indeed, scientists (see Lodge’s epigraph), cannot help assuming that what 
they investigate works in a systemic way, and generations of linguistics 
students have been taught that language is a “system of signs7” (Saussure 
(De) 1916/1959: 15) (or a "system of systems" according to Guillaume 1973: 
176), whose mechanisms need to be uncovered and specified by linguists. 
                                                        
6 Like any scientist, a linguist might incorrectly posit the existence of an entity that 
complies with her theoretical model and justifies her observation (e.g. phlogiston 
before Lavoisier, ether before Einstein, see Chalmers 1999: 114). This issue is 
probably more difficult to tackle in linguistics than in natural sciences, since rules are 
at best neurological processes that so far cannot be observed. 
7 Lass (1980: 89) criticizes the term system “used very loosely in describing various 
aspects of language […]. The most this would be likely to do is to give us a pseudo-
precision, i.e. create a false sense that there are algorithms at the bottom of the 
garden––when we get there.” 
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However, does language nicely meet the scientific expectations harbored by 
linguists? Let us consider an example. 
2.3. The quest for the unruly rule… 
While comparing the sentences “La pendule retarde [lapãdylrətard]” (the 
clock is slow) and “La pendule retardait [lapãdylrətardɛ]” (the clock was 
slow), Dubois (1967: 9) refers to a “system of marks” (“système de 
marques”), thus allowing the systemic discrimination between Pr /ʁətaʁd/ and 
Imparfait /ʁətaʁdɛ/. Hence, accordingly Dubois (1967: 61) argues that for the 
three idiosyncratic Pr5 forms from, respectively, be, say and do /ɛt/ (êtes), 
/dit/ (dites), /fɛt/ (faites), “a specific type of morphophoneme /t/” is added to 
Pr2 /ɛ/ (es), /di/ (dis), /fɛ/ (fais). From a scientific point of view, this 
statement undeniably constitutes an accurate description of the data. 
However, it raises some epistemological questions regarding its status. Does 
it reflect a cognitive reality in the speakers’ brain? If, after Dubois, we grant 
the above description the status of a systemic rule, for French verbs’ Pr5, 
there would be two “competing” rules, namely the one adding /t/ to Pr2 for 
être, dire and faire, and the one adding /e/ to Pr2, here represented by laver 
(wash), and courir (run): 
Rule 1 Rule 2 
Pr2 ɛ, di, fɛ  
   
Pr5 ɛ, di, fɛ t 
 
lav, kuʁ  
  
lav, kuʁ e 
 
Table 2 – Two possible competing rules for Pr5 in French? 
Among the 64708 verbs from the Petit Robert (2013) dictionary, rule 1 
applies exclusively to these three verbs, whereas rule 2 concerns more than 
5500 verbs (∼86%), i.e. the ones with only one Pr radical, such as /lav/ 
(wash-Pr1-3.6), or /kuʁ/ (run-Pr1-3.6). Could Dubois’s description reflect 
what really takes place in French speakers’ brain? Are ordinary speakers 
aware of the existence of this idiosyncratic morpheme /t/9? What could be the 
processing stages involved to become aware of this rule and memorize it? 
Here are some possible steps: 
a) Have access to at least two forms from one of these three verbs; 
                                                        
8 This corpus of 6470 verbs was collected from the electronic version of the dictionary 
Le Petit Robert (2013). Verbs have been manually organized by types following the 
classifications proposed by Pouradier Duteil (1997) and Séguin (1986). 
9 Such a morpheme theoretically exists elsewhere in verb paradigms, namely in PS5. 
However, this tense is no longer used orally and hence makes the morpheme /t/ purely 
theoretical. 
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b) Hypothesize rule 1; e.g. for être, the observation of /ɛ/ for Pr2, and 
/ɛt/ for Pr5 leads to the following rule: Pr5=Pr2+/t/ and Pr2=Pr5-/t/; 
c) Memorize that rule 1 applies to être; 
d) Hypothesize the extension of this rule to other verbs; 
e) Realize that rule 1 does not work for thousands of French verbs, and 
hence has to be inhibited to avoid deviant forms such as /*kuʁt/ (run-
Pr5), instead of /kuʁe/; 
f) Memorize the inhibition instruction e); 
g) Have access to the four other forms /di/-/dit/, and /fɛ/-/fɛt/; 
h) Compare these forms as done in b) with être; 
i) Realize that the rules found in b) also apply to these forms; 
j) Memorize that these rules only apply to dire and faire (i.e. refine e) 
and f)); 
Apparently, since steps a) and g) are necessary to establish rule 1 (i.e. access 
the six forms governed by this rule), direct rote memorization of these forms 
looks more efficient and straightforward for the speaker10. Martinet, probably 
relying on his own native speaker’s intuition, challenges Dubois’s 
explanation: 
on ne remarque pas que l'analyse /ê-t/, /fe-t/, /di-t/ que pourrait suggérer une 
comparaison avec les trois singuliers correspondants /il è/, /il fè/, /il di/ 
corresponde, dans l'usage, à un rapprochement analogique efficace: vous êtes est 
bien ancré chez les sujets qui, par millions, laisseront échapper vous faisez et vous 
disez. (Martinet 1974: 99) 
Although oversimplified, this short presentation raises questions about the 
possible tensions between a scientifically coherent explanation and its actual 
                                                        
10 My point obviously echoes the debate in verb morphology as to the extent of the 
role of rote memorization versus rule implementation (see Baayen 2007 ; Bybee 
1995 ; Clahsen 2006 ; Marcus 2000 ; Nakisha, Plunkett & Hahn 2000 ; Pinker 1999: 
121ff). Langacker’s (1987: 29) argues about this “rule/list fallacy” i.e. “the 
assumption, on grounds of simplicity, that particular statements (i.e. lists) must be 
excised from the grammar of a language if general statements (i.e. rules) that subsume 
them can be established. Given the general N + -s noun-pluralizing rule of English, 
for instance, specific plural forms following that rule (beads, shoes, toes, walls) would 
not be listed in an optimal grammar. […] this is a specious kind of simplicity for 
anyone taking seriously the goal of ‘psychological reality’ in linguistic description. It 
is gratuitous to assume that mastery of a rule like N + -s, and mastery of forms like 
beads that accord with this rule, are mutually exclusive facets of a speaker's 
knowledge of his language; it is perfectly plausible that the two might sometimes 
coexist. We do not lose a generalization by including both the rule and specific plural 
forms in the grammar of English, since the rule itself expresses the generalization”. 
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plausibility from the ordinary speakers’ point of view11. Can linguists posit 
the existence of rules on mere theoretical grounds without ever attempting to 
assess their actual plausibility in the speakers’ brain? Should we endorse the 
“proponents of linguistic rules [who] do not necessarily view them as 
psychologically real” (Corrigan & Lima 1994: xv)? Although most of these 
questions have been addressed by (psycho)linguists (see note 10 for 
references), there remain some essential epistemological issues that I wish to 
partially discuss here. 
2.4. Is language cloud- or clock-like? 
In his Of clouds and clocks lecture presented in 1965, Popper explains his 
title as follows: 
My clouds are intended to represent physical systems which, like gases, are highly 
irregular, disorderly, and more or less unpredictable. I shall assume that we have 
before us a schema or arrangement in which a very disturbed or disorderly cloud 
is placed on the left. On the other extreme of our arrangement, on its right, we 
may place a very reliable pendulum clock, a precision clock, intended to represent 
physical systems which are regular, orderly, and highly predictable in their 
behavior. (Popper 1972: 207) 
Although Popper’s subject is remote from our linguistic discussion, his 
metaphor raises an important epistemological issue concerning the nature of 
the object under investigation, and hence the type of description scientists 
might come up with12. If languages were clock-like, then descriptive 
coherence would be easy to achieve: observed regularities could be 
formulated as rules by linguists and would reflect all the mechanisms 
involved in language. However, although language is not as unpredictable as 
a cloud, there might be some parts of it that do not follow rules13. Then the 
question arises as to whether linguists should keep trying to look for them. 
Let us take an example. While trying to formulate rules to describe French PS 
                                                        
11 One may object that though predictive, Dubois’s rule does not have a high enough 
predictivity rate. This example raises as well the question of the threshold to be 
reached for a rule to become productive for ordinary speakers: 10 items? 30? 100? (in 
his “minimal generalization learner model”, this issue of “critical number” is also 
raised from a somewhat different perspective by Albright 2002: 41). 
12 Popper’s lecture discusses “the problem of rationality and the freedom of man.” 
13 In his discussion about rules––from a very different perspective from mine––, 
Fradin (2003: 266) notes : “En morphologie […] il est rare qu'on couvre l'ensemble 
des expressions relevant d'un phénomène au moyen d'une règle unique et nettement 
formulée. […] Très souvent, la règle décrit une portion des faits, et laisse un résidu 
plus ou moins important." 
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and PP within the once acclaimed generative phonology framework14, Plénat 
(1987: 137-138) ends up proposing “around fifteen often very simple rules.” 
Nonetheless, albeit his scrupulous study, Plénat (1987: 138) wonders whether 
his endeavor was not in its very essence vain since “dans un tel ensemble, il 
est fatal qu'un linguiste découvre un certain nombre de régularités” (see also 
Morin 1987: 76). Besides this insightful epistemological self-criticism, Plénat 
raises what I hold to be a fundamental question about the status of the rule 
with respect to ordinary speakers (my emphasis): 
[le linguiste] a-t-il […] le droit de supposer que ces régularités sont repérées et 
apprises comme telles par les locuteurs, d'en faire des règles de la grammaire que 
chacun intériorise? Certainement pas. On pourrait soutenir avec autant de 
vraisemblance que les verbes irréguliers constituent en synchronie un chaos de 
formes disparates qui doivent être mémorisées […]. (Plénat 1987: 138) 
This “chaos of disparate forms that must to be memorized” would belong to 
the cloud-like part of language and impede the linguists’ quest for rules, since 
as Plénat argues, speakers “certainly” do not implement his proposed rules to 
produce irregular PP or PS forms, but––as advocated earlier in the case of 
Pr5 for dire, faire and être––just learn the whole forms by rote. This 
epistemological stance is summarized in the figure below. 
                                                        
14 Plénat (1987: 93) used what he himself labels “dated” (“désuet”) Chomsky & 
Halle’s (1968) influential theoretical framework from The Sound Pattern of English. 
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object description 
 
The description of the upper 
part 1 (the “clock-like” one) 
allows linguists to easily 
formulate rules and present a 
coherent theoretical model. 
Since the bottom part 2 is 
“cloud-like”, then linguists 
should not strive to find rules 
there, though they may still 
do, and like Plénat and many 
others, end up finding some15. 
Figure 1 – An epistemological view of language: from cloud to clock… 
Plénat’s mentioning of speakers16 is of crucial importance here. Indeed, as a 
first approach, language could be regarded as any scientific object, and 
treated by linguists, as astronomers would a planet, biologists a virus, etc. For 
instance, by bypassing the cardinal role speakers play in the existence of the 
language data, Chomsky somehow illustrates such a position:  
A grammar of the language L is essentially a theory of L. Any scientific theory is 
based on a finite number of observations, and it seeks to relate the observed 
phenomena and to predict new phenomena by constructing general laws in terms 
                                                        
15 Plénat (1987: 139) modestly acknowledges: “Les règles découvertes n’ont jamais 
l’occasion de s’appliquer au-delà du corpus qui a servi à les établir". This remark is 
particularly appropriate concerning PS, since most French native speakers ignore the 
standard forms from 2nd and 3rd groups provided by grammar books (examples of 
common deviant forms are given in Kilani-Schoch & Dressler 2005: 199ff). 
16 This obviously depends on the epistemological status given to the role of the theory 
with respect to language. For instance, Chomsky’s (1969: 25) highly influential 
position holds that “a child who has learned a language has developed an internal 
representation of a system of rules”, and that the “long-range task for general 
linguistics [is to] set the problem of developing an account of this innate linguistic 
theory that provides the basis for language learning. (Note that we are […] using the 
term ‘theory’ […] with a systematic ambiguity, to refer both to the child's innate 
predisposition to learn a language […] and to the linguist's account of this.)” (my 
emphasis). Such a position allows linguists working within this paradigm to disregard 
the difference between meta-level and object-level, and ignore the speakers’ point of 
view since “a generative grammar is not a model for a speaker or a hearer” (Chomsky 
1969: 9). 
clock-like 
cloud-like 
Language 
irregular 
regular 
 
1 
2 
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of hypothetical constructs such as (in physics, for example) ‘mass’ and 
‘electron’.17 Chomsky (1957/2002: 49)  
However, in linguistics such a ”hard science” approach faces at least the 
following problems: 1) there is no such thing as “a language” per se (see 
Langacker 2008: 215ff)––any such entity is in fact a scientific and/or 
sociocultural reconstruction by linguists and/or native speakers; 2) native 
speakers: a) need to acquire their language; b) develop idiosyncratic ways of 
using language; c) need to use their brain and body in order to be able to 
speak; d) have access to what they say, but not to how they actually came up 
with the sentences they uttered; e) speak to other people to communicate; f) 
end up developing some metalinguistic representation of their own language. 
My main concern here relates to the status of the rule in relation to speakers 
once we acknowledge these facts. One of the first examples is alluded to by 
Plénat in his conclusion (my emphasis): 
Personne, sans doute, n'irait jusqu'à prétendre qu'elles [=les formes irrégulières] 
sont apprises une par une. Mais elles pourraient l'être très diversement suivant les 
locuteurs, et la description présentée ici n'aurait, sur telle ou telle autre 
présentation que le mince avantage – si c’en est un –, d’être plus compacte. Elle 
ne révèlerait en rien la façon dont un locuteur organise ses connaissances.  
[…] Il n'y a naturellement pas lieu de croire que tous les locuteurs ont intériorisé 
exactement les mêmes règles de formation […] (Plénat 1987: 138-139 & 141)  
What do we know about the way individual speakers organize their own 
knowledge? The fact that for scientific reasons, scientists need to work 
inductively on large amounts of data raises epistemological questions 
regarding the observation of regularities and the resulting formulation of 
rules18. Here the difference between say physics and linguistics is 
fundamental. A physicist studying the way stones fall does not need to 
consider that (2a) these stones had to learn how to fall, and above all (2b) that 
they all do it in a “personal” way (bound to a specific temporal and spatial 
context)19. In linguistics however, while studying language acquisition, 
linguists do notice individual differences (see also Kail 2012: 38-39): 
One conclusion seems uncontroversial: the Average Child is a fiction, a 
descriptive convenience like the Average Man or the Average Woman. Theories 
                                                        
17 Elsewhere Chomsky (1957/2002: 48) uses a revealing analogy concerning his 
position toward the object: “Perhaps the issue can be clarified by an analogy to a part 
of chemical theory concerned with the structurally possible compounds. This theory 
might be said to generate all physically possible compounds just as a grammar 
generates all grammatically 'possible' utterances.” 
18 (for other issues raised by inductive reasoning, see e.g. Hempel 1966: 200). 
19 Let alone (2e): to communicate with other stones. 
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of language development can no longer rely on this mythical being. Any theory 
worth the name will have to account for the variations that are reliably observed in 
early language learning. (Bates, Dale & Thal 1995: 151)20 
One might argue that this is limited to “early language learning” and does not 
concern adults’ speaking ability. But how do we know? How can we be sure 
that the variety of learning styles at early age fades out in mature daily 
language practice and never gives rise to different underlying speaking 
strategies? Besides, while analyzing data, whereas “deviant” forms can easily 
be detected, and interpreted as echoing underlying “defective” structures, a 
correct surface form never absolutely guarantees that a “correct” underlying 
rule21 has been used. Let us examine some of Damourette & Pichon’s 
collected mistakes for PC forms, found in children’s, as well as adults’ 
popular language (“le parler du peuple”): 
Il est curieux de constater que, d'après l'analogie vous répondez/répons [ʁepõ], il 
craint/craint, le parler du peuple et celui des enfants reforment des [PP] […] par 
troncature du radical: vous cous-ez [kuze]/cous [ku(z)]; vous vivez [vive]/vi [vi]; 
vous taisez [tɛze]/tais [tɛ], etc. [I reformatted the phonetic transcription] 
(Damourette & Pichon 1911-1930: 134) 
There is no need to postulate a truncation from the Pr5 radical––which 
anyhow does not work for craindre, yielding /kʁɛɲ/ instead of /kʁ / (craint) 
as mentioned by the authors––, children and adult might as well be using Pr1-
3 (i.e. as PP) to form their PC (see Morin 1987: 76), hence leading to /ilavi/–
–from, say, Pr3 /ilvi/ (il vit)––instead of /ilaveky/ (il a vécu) (an error, among 
others, also mentioned by Plénat 1987: 139-140)22. In cases such as /ilavi/, 
linguists cannot but identify these forms as errors, and then logically 
hypothesize a wrong underlying rule leading to these wrong surface forms. 
However, the child (or the adult), who constructs PC with the rule “use avoir-
Pr+Pr1-3” will also produce “correct” surface-forms such as /ilafini/ (il a 
fini), /ilafɛ/ (il a fait), /iladi/ (il a dit), /ilaekʁi/ (il a écrit), /ilakõdɥi/ (il a 
conduit), etc. These “mistakes” (see infra) based on a “wrong underlying 
rule” will obviously pass unnoticed. In other words, what the grammatical 
and linguistic tradition regards as the correct formation of PC––involving a 
                                                        
20 Child language being individually investigated naturally receives closer attention 
than adult language. 
21 I am aware that my use of “correct” here is problematic. We could equate it with “a 
standard adult grammatical rule hypothesized by linguists and possibly intuited by 
ordinary adult speakers” (somehow resembling the ‘constructive rule’ among the 
three types proposed by Besse 1991). 
22 Plénat proposes an alternative explanation based on his theoretical model. 
 12 
PP (i.e. a specific form, not to be equated with Pr1-3)––might not reflect 
what speakers actually do. 
To further investigate the epistemological consequence of this issue, let us 
imagine that French PC is––for the sake of the demonstration––exclusively 
constructed with the Pr of the avoir auxiliary (and never with être auxiliary). 
Then an ordinary speaker (whether a child or an adult) might use the above-
mentioned rule complemented by Rule 223: 
Rule 1: “For type X verbs, PC=avoir-Pr+Pr1-3”: e.g. /ilaaȝi/ (il a agi), from Pr1-3 
/aȝi/ (agis/t) 
Rule 2: “For verbs with /e/-ending Inf, PC=avoir-Pr+Inf”: e.g. /ilalave/ (il a lavé) 
from Inf /lave/ (laver) 
These two rules would cover 96% of the 6500 verbs from the Petit Robert, 
respectively 6.5% and 89.5%. The remainder (250 verbs) would have to be 
memorized one by one as “idiosyncratic”. The deviant forms mentioned 
above by Damourette & Pichon (as well as the ones cited by Plénat 1987: 
139-140) belong to the set of more than 400 verbs, which conform to Rule 1 
and have homophonous forms for Pr1-3 and PP. 
Even though probably most linguists would reject Rules 1 and 2, the fact that 
these two “wrong” underlying rules can produce 96% of correct surface 
forms (/ilaaȝi/, /ilalave/ sound perfect!) raises serious epistemological 
questions. One could argue that so-called 1st group verbs are overrepresented 
compared to their actual share in daily conversation, thus giving a distorted 
view of the issue. But even within the 200 most frequent verbs (according to 
Gougenheim, Michéa, Rivenc & Sauvageot 1964), the production of correct 
surface forms with Rules 1 and 2 still reaches 71% (6% for R1, 65% for R224, 
contra 29% for the rest25). It could be further objected that, on linguistic 
ground, the semantic or functional nature of Inf does not allow its usage as 
PP to construct PC according to our speaker’s Rule 2. If, again from an 
ordinary speaker’s point of view, this difference were clear, then why would 
French grammar books need to give “tricks” such as the one below to avoid 
the spelling confusion between fermer (Inf) and fermé (PP)? 
                                                        
23 Bassano et al.’s (2001: 143) French acquisition data corroborates Rule 2. 
Accordingly, as Kilani-Schoch (2003: 289) notes, “there should be analogical PP 
forms based on Inf”; she found “avait mettre” instead of “avait mis” in her corpus. 
24 Frequent spelling mistakes, e.g. “il a chanter” (Inf) for “il a chanté” (PP), tend to 
corroborate such a possibility. 
25 For the remainder, which can be subdivided into less than twenty similar rime 
subsets such as Pr6 /ãtãd/ > PP /ãtãdy/ (entendu), Pr6 /ʁãd/ > PP /ʁãdy/ (rendu), 
Bybee’s (1995: 428) network model suffices to explain how “morphological structure 
emerges from the connections [words] make with other words in the lexicon.” 
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Pour distinguer les diverses terminaisons des verbes du 1er groupe, on peut 
remplacer la forme pour laquelle on hésite par un verbe du 2e ou du 3e groupe; on 
entend alors la différence. 
[…] Nous avons fermé la porte → Nous avons ouvert la porte (Bled, Bled & 
Berlion 2010: 45) 
Since such spelling confusions between homophonous PP and Inf persist 
despite years of explicit and implicit teaching (up to 20% of spelling errors 
for 15 year-old students, according to Brissaud 2002: 63), it seems legitimate 
to question whether the semantic or functional difference tacitly advocated by 
linguists and grammarians actually corresponds to ordinary speakers’ use of 
underlying rules. 
Let us synthesize the epistemological issue raised by these imagined “wrong 
underlying rules” yielding a vast amount of correct surface forms. In the table 
below, LA stands for “linguistically acceptable”, PCSF for “production of 
correct surface forms” and DE for “detectable errors”; figures are rounded 
and based on the corpus of verbs from the Petit Robert (2013) and the 
Français élémentaire (Gougenheim et al. 1964)26. 
  Number of verbs       
PC formation rules  N=6500 N=200 LA? PCSF? DE?    
R1 avoir-Pr+Pr1-3  6,5% 6% no yes no    
R2 avoir-Pr+Inf  89.5% 65% no yes no    
           
  Total 96% 71% no yes no  A ‘incorrect’ interpretation 
           
Neither R1 nor R2  4% 29% no no yes  B correct interpretation 
Table 3 – “Wrong underlying rules” yielding correct surface forms 
The problem arises from the tension between the ordinary speaker’s 
perspective and the linguist’s. On the one hand, the ordinary speaker uses 
rules that would be discarded as wrong by linguists (since neither Pr1-3 nor 
Inf are PPs), although the forms she produces sound objectively right (e.g. 
R1: /ilafɥi/, il a fui; R2: /ilaʃãte/, il a chanté) in 96% (N=6500) or 71% 
(N=200) of the data. On the other hand, the linguist posits a scientifically 
acceptable rule Rx, say PC=avoir-Pr+PP (in which PP meets linguistic 
criteria acknowledged in the field, and is therefore highly predictive), and 
sees that the data complies with Rx, even though this is not the rule that the 
ordinary speaker uses. The matching of the posited scientific rule with the 
hypothesized underlying speaker’s rule responsible for a vast amount of the 
data is thus an illusion. Hence configuration A leads to an “incorrect”––albeit 
unavoidable––interpretation of the data by the linguist. The only correct 
interpretation would in fact come from B, which, in 4% (N=6500) and 29% 
                                                        
26 Calculations are based on data manually tagged in Excel. 
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(N=200) of the cases, allows the detection of errors in surface forms 
produced by Rule 1––e.g. /ilaʁepõ/, from Pr1-3 /ʁepõ/, instead of 
/ilaʁepõdy/ (il a répondu) (listed by Damourette & Pichon 1911-1930: 134). 
Insofar as linguistics does not have any direct access to speakers’ production 
processes, there seems to be no way to escape this linguistically embarrassing 
epistemological state of affairs (see however the tentative exploration of 
neural substrates underlying production processes in Sahin, Pinker, Cash, 
Schomer & Halgren 2009). In the end, this discussion boils down to the 
fundamental question (mostly irrelevant in other sciences): what are the 
possible arguments that would allow us to hypothesize that ordinary speakers 
think and speak in accordance with a specific scientifically coherent model? 
Although there might be no answer to this thorny question, this is no reason 
to dismiss ordinary speakers’ perspective as irrelevant. 
2.5. Advocating an ordinary speaker’s perspective in linguistics 
In order to clarify the expression “ordinary speaker”, let me first quote this 
highly instructive account from a bilingual native––and ideally ordinary, 
albeit unique––speaker of French and English, raised in Louisiana, who never 
learned to write or read French. In this passage, he explains to the interviewer 
why it is difficult for him to translate a single English word into a single 
French word (here the translation for tree):  
– Comment vous dites cold? 
– [lœfrɛ]. C'est-à-dire, c'est selon l'histoire […]. Tu vois, pour un n-exemple, t'as 
larbre, narbre, arbre ou zarbre: un narbre. Tu vois, t'as […] des fois t'uses le mot 
larbre, narbre, arbre ou zarbre. Zarbre veut dire "plus […] qu'un". En anglais, 
t'uses un mot. Ça me gêne pas si y en a un ou i n'n a dix, c'est toujours le même 
mot. Et en français, t'as quatre mots […] (quoted in Morin 2005: 14) 
In his metalinguistic discussion about what linguists would call the French 
“liaison“, the speaker mentions the four surface forms larbre, narbre, arbre 
zarbre, which, for him represent “four words” (“en français, t’as quatre 
mots”), among which “zarbre” is the word “meaning more than one” (“plus 
qu’un”). This passage presents the ultimate––though obviously extremely 
rare––ordinary speaker, expressing genuinely his metalinguistic judgment, 
uninfluenced by writing27. Had he been literate, this speaker would probably 
never have made such a claim. Though anecdotal, this enlightening passage 
gives us some insight into what a literate ordinary speaker––and not a theory-
driven one––would be if not influenced by years of schooling, reading, 
                                                        
27 It is hard to evaluate the impact of writing, reading and schooling on our 
metalinguistic knowledge. Moreover, introspective and retrospective efforts into 
personal preschool memories in order to shed light on the issue are doomed to fail. 
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writing and grammar teaching. Such an account is probably the closest we 
can get to self-introspection about underlying rules. It should therefore be 
considered as a possible perspective for linguistic investigation (this is done 
by Morin 2005). 
Although speakers from compulsory schooling societies are probably highly 
influenced by writing and grammatical tradition in their metalinguistic 
analyses, it is nonetheless unlikely that core language mechanisms acquired 
during early childhood change significantly under the influence of schooling. 
And as the spelling confusions, mentioned earlier, between –é and –er in verb 
endings (“il a *tuer” for “il a tué”; see the extensive study on this issue by 
Brissaud, Chevrot & Lefrançois 2006) tend to show, it takes years of training 
to inculcate what might be perceived as counter-intuitive spelling to some 
speakers who, we could hypothesize, use different underlying rules. 
In other words, an “ordinary speaker” is a normal language user who 
primarily speaks the language in her own way. Although trivial, this 
statement is of prime importance to avoid sacrificing ordinary speakers’ point 
of view for the sake of preserving the coherence of the theoretical model 
proposed by linguists. This position echoes Saussure’s difference between 
objective analysis, “based on history” and carried out by linguists, and 
subjective analysis, that “speakers constantly make of the units of language” 
(Saussure (De) 1916/1959: 183). Thus, while dealing with analogy: 
The grammarian is prone to think that spontaneous analyses of language are 
wrong; the truth is that subjective analysis is no more false than "false" analogy. 
[…] There is no common yardstick for both the analysis of speakers and the 
analysis of the historian although both use the same procedure: the confrontation 
of series that have a common element. Both analyses are justifiable, and each 
retains its value. In the last resort, however, only the speakers' analysis matters, 
for it is based directly on the facts of language.  
(Saussure (De) 1916/1959: 183) (my emphasis) 
The importance of ordinary speakers is even more explicitly stated in 
Saussure’s manuscripts found in 1996: “avant de venir nous parler 
d’abstractions, il faut avoir un critérium fixe touchant ce qu’on peut appeler 
réel en morphologie. Critérium : Ce qui est réel, c’est ce dont les sujets 
parlants ont conscience à un degré quelconque; tout ce dont ils ont 
conscience et rien que ce dont ils peuvent avoir conscience" (Saussure (De) 
2002: 183) (for a thorough argument, see also Komatsu & Wolf 1996: 70ff). 
This emphasis on speakers’ awareness naturally leads to pay more attention 
to surface forms, i.e. “living units perceived by speakers” (Saussure (De) 
1916/1959: 170): 
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In Modern French, somnolent 'sleepy' is analyzed somnol-ent, as if it were a 
present participle. Proof of this is the existence of the verb somnoler 'be sleepy.' 
But in Latin the division was somno-lentus, like succu-lentus, etc., and before that 
it was somn-olentus 'smelling of sleep,' from olere, as in vin-olentus 'smelling of 
wine’. The most obvious and important effect of analogy is thus the substituting 
of more regular forms composed of living elements for older irregular and 
obsolescent forms. (Saussure (De) 1916/1959: 170-171) 
Following Saussure’s emphasis on the role of “subjective analysis” in 
language, I will advocate an “intuitive” linguistic analysis28, to remain as 
close as possible to ordinary speakers’ intuition. As linguists, we should 
endeavor to satisfy at least the following points29: 
a) Refrain from projecting theoretical constraints onto the object 
b) Keep as close as possible to ordinary speakers’ metalinguistic 
intuition  
c) Be consistent with language acquisition data 
d) Be consistent with ordinary language use 
e) Beware of any biased analysis induced by writing 
f) Take existing surface forms as basis for the analysis and avoid 
postulating abstract underlying entities on theoretical ground 
g) Account for diachronic “residue” in the language 
h) Consider that inflected verbs are the result of a process in time and 
that an inflected verb is not an isolated item but always appears in an 
utterance 
I will now discuss points a) to d) with examples taken from the literature 
about French morphology30. 
2.5.1. Refrain from projecting scientific constraints onto the object 
As I have already partly discussed this issue in 2.1, I will only briefly recall 
two of the main scientific constraints a theoretical model faces when it strives 
to be coherent and predictive31. The figure below schematically synthesizes 
                                                        
28 Even though Saussure (De) (1916/1959: 183) clearly states that “subjective” refers 
to speakers (i.e. subjects), this term is somehow misleading both in French and 
English, since it is usually opposed to “objective”, which tends to be equated with 
“true” or “scientifically demonstrated”. I will therefore use “intuitive” instead.  
29 This list is not meant to be exhaustive. For the time being, it should be considered 
as a general guideline. Points a) and b) are found in Allan (2003: 552). 
30 The original draft of this article dealt with each point, but has been shortened by 
half for editorial reasons. 
31 Obviously I am not claiming that these criteria are irrelevant. Nonetheless, in 
linguistics, confusion between meta-level and object-level may lead us astray. For 
instance, the word rule may refer to both levels, either the way the language is 
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the tension between the projected theory-driven object, resulting from these 
criteria, and the “real” object (see note 5). 
  PROJECTED OBJECT  “REAL” OBJECT 
scientific criteria for 
a theoretical model 
 resulting mirrored expected 
features in the object 
 possible intrinsic reality of 
the object 
     
coherent  homogeneous ≠ partly clock- and cloud-like 
predictive  regular ≠ regular and irregular 
Figure 2 – Epistemological tensions between projected and “real” object  
2.5.2. Keep as close as possible to ordinary speakers’ metalinguistic intuition 
This first point is admittedly impressionistic and obviously leaves a lot of 
room to personal interpretation but relates to the other points. It is meant as a 
reminder to avoid treating language as an abstract object that transcends 
speakers’ daily usage and intuition. After all, linguistics itself is a scientific 
offshoot of speakers’ own intuition on language, and it seems paradoxical 
that some linguists propose models inaccessible to their own native speakers’ 
intuition, despite years of training in the field. 
Let me give one example of metalinguistic comment about a spelling 
confusion between homophonous /e/ endings verbs32. While asked why she 
wrote “On avait crier tous en même temps” (orthographically: avoir-
Imp3+Inf) (instead of orthographic PP crié), a primary school pupil answers: 
“Crier, er, parce que quand deux verbes se suivent, le deuxième est à 
l’infinitif” (Brissaud, Cogis, Jaffré, Pellat & Fayol 2011: 238). At this level 
of schooling, such a statement (“when two verbs follow one another, the 
second must be an Infinitive”) clearly shows a good mastery of 
metalinguistic terms (verb, infinitive), but the pupil’s spontaneous intuitive 
explanation would be regarded as wrong by linguistic standards, although 
while speaking nobody would have noticed that her rule “does not work”. 
The question is now: is this pupil’s intuition right or wrong? From a scientific 
point of view, her explanation is wrong. From an ordinary speaker’s point of 
view her intuition is right. It yields correct surface forms with /e/-ending type 
verbs (such as crier) and allows to successfully produce an infinite number of 
correct sentences (“Il avait /dãse/”; “Elles auront /ȝwe/”; “J’ai /mãȝe/”, etc.). 
Then are linguists entitled to claim that they are right against speakers’ 
                                                                                                                       
supposed to work intrinsically or the account that linguists give of such ‘mechanisms’ 
(I am thus opposed to Chomsky’s deliberate ambiguous use of the word theory. For a 
discussion, see Langacker 1990). 
32 I have selected this comment to serve my epistemological discussion. I have no 
specific position regarding the spelling issue itself, and to what extent it actually 
reveals underlying rules used by speakers. 
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intuitions? I would opt for a negative answer. As mentioned earlier, 
linguistics as a science strives for coherence and exhaustiveness, and on this 
ground would discard this intuitive rule since 1) it is not specific enough33 
and 2) it does not work for all types of verbs (e.g. “On avait *finir”), and 
science would thus require the formulation of a better and more general rule. 
Then, coming back to the essence of our discussion, if linguists are to 
describe language, is it epistemologically legitimate for them to disregard the 
way an ordinary speaker uses her own rules, which, in the end, along with 
other speakers’ idiosyncratic rules provide the data, on which basis linguists 
propose “a” description, and formulate rules? 
In other words, taking speakers’ metalinguistic intuition seriously results in 
the following unsatisfactory epistemological dilemma: 
1. The linguist acknowledges that the data collected jumbles up 
speakers’ idiosyncratic sets of rules, but she still endeavors to 
formulate ‘average rules’ that do not represent any speaker34; 
2. Or she presupposes (or most likely believes) that all speakers use the 
same underlying rules, which “just” need to be uncovered and then 
scientifically formulated. 
Once again, I have no solution to this puzzling state of affairs. 
Let us now turn to the next point, which concerns theoretical consistency 
with language acquisition data. 
2.5.3. Be consistent with language acquisition data 
It might look unfair to evaluate the validity of a linguistic theory against 
language acquisition data, if it was initially meant to describe mature 
speakers’ language. However, if we consider that the early years of language 
acquisition set the foundation for further developments and effortless 
language use in later life, then it seems reasonable to examine whether a 
linguistic theory is consistent with language acquisition data. Whenever it 
fails to do so, then possible reasons for this incompatibility should be 
discussed. 
While describing French Pr, Morin (1987: 37) proposes––among others––the 
following “implication rule”: “Pr2 serves as basis for Pr1". This rule does not 
                                                        
33 Such a legitimate scientific criticism would be unfair to the pupil’s metalinguistic 
self-justification, which, although general, was limited to the written sentence she was 
asked to comment. 
34 Recall Bates et al.’s (1995: 151) discontent mentioned earlier: “the Average Child 
is a fiction, a descriptive convenience”. Is the “average rule” a fiction as well? 
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accord with the child acquisition data provided by Bassano et al. (2001: 125), 
who mention that children use 1st before 2nd person. Morin anticipates this 
objection and clarifies the status of his implication rules: 
ce ne sont pas des stratégies d’acquisition de la langue […]. Elles appartiennent en 
propre à la grammaire de l’adulte et ne se sont probablement mises en place que 
progressivement pendant les premiers stades de l’acquisition. (Morin 1987: 38) 
If these implication rules belong to adults’ grammar proper, then 1) what 
kind of strategies do children use while acquiring language? 2) When, how 
and why does the shift from child grammar to adult grammar happen? Since 
some of Morin’s implication rules may not match children’s data, then his 
hypothesized “gradual rule setting” procedure would need to be tested. 
Let us take another more undisputable example. In an earlier model of his, 
Boyé (2000: 397) derives all French simple tenses from Imp’s theme35, thus 
yielding, among others, the following rules: a) Fut=Imp+(ə); b) Inf=Imp+(e). 
This, again, raises an order of acquisition issue. Indeed, Inf and Fut being 
acquired before Imp (Bassano et al. 2001 ; Kilani-Schoch 2003 ; Sabeau-
Jouannet 1973), both a) and b) would be unavailable to the child, thus raising 
the same questions as above. 
2.5.4. Be consistent with ordinary language use 
In his description of Fut formation, Touratier compares Fut1-3 with PS1-3 
inflections, that are indeed similar /e/, /a/, /a/ (see also Van Den Eynde & 
Blanche-Benveniste 1970: 417): 
Elles sont comparables à celles du passé simple de la première conjugaison: 
je chanterai, tu chanteras, il chantera; je chantai, tu chantas, il chanta" 
et l'on peut les décrire en disant que le futur est marqué par un segment /(ə)Ra/  
(Touratier 1996: 38-39) 
As stated decades ago by Benveniste (1966: 237ff), PS is no longer used in 
conversational interaction in contemporary French, thus precluding the use of 
tu and vous. Even the most frequent French verbs (être, avoir, aller, vouloir, 
etc.) never allow PS2 and PS5 (see Blanche-Benveniste 2002: 21), although 
they still appear, to my knowledge, in all contemporary conjugation 
textbooks. What is then the scientific status of Touratier’s comparison once 
we acknowledge that 1) PS is almost exclusively used in written French, and 
2a) does not allow tu/vous, and 2b) almost never je/nous, and that 3) Fut is 
still a commonly used tense that allows all persons? To be relevant, such an 
asymmetrical comparison would need to be scientifically justified since 
ordinary speakers probably do not make this comparison. 
                                                        
35 Taking Pr4-5 as basis also goes against acquisition data. 
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3. Conclusion: “Wouldn’t it be better to make the map conform 
to the yard?” 
...In that Empire, the craft of Cartography attained such 
Perfection that the Map of a Single province covered the 
space of an entire City, and the Map of the Empire itself an 
entire Province. In the course of Time, these extensive maps 
were found somehow wanting, and so the College of 
Cartographers evolved a Map of the Empire that was of the 
same Scale as the Empire and that coincided with it point for 
point. 
Of Exactitude in Science (Borges 1954/1972: 141) 
While describing languages, linguists, like other scientists, run into Borges’s 
cartographers’ epistemological dilemma: 
i) be as accurate as possible 
ii) be as concise as possible36 
However this problematic situation is not the sole difficulty scientists run 
into. Language, as any scientific “object”, is not directly observable, but 
needs to be theoretically reconstructed by linguists. A second major 
epistemological problem then arises in relation to i), and humorously 
summarized in Bill Watterson’s comic strip: 
 
Calvin and Hobbes (Watterson 2005: 407) 
One of the greatest and most difficult challenges linguists have to face, as 
Hobbes (the tiger) wisely suggests to Calvin, is “to make the map conform to 
the yard” and not the other way round. Such an epistemological issue is 
mostly ignored in linguistics. Fradin (2003: 265), for instance, is one of the 
few linguists to tackle the question, but he ends up stating an 
                                                        
36 This tension is summarized in Van den Eynde & Blanche-Benveniste’s (1970: 406) 
explicit goal: "Le but de toute analyse est d'arriver à décrire une multitude de formes 
en partant d'un nombre restreint d'éléments et de règles de combinaison entre ces 
éléments, qui permettent de présenter ces formes comme ‘prédictibles’"· 
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"epistemological disclaimer": "Le niveau conceptuel mis en jeu par les règles 
proposées ici est donc uniquement descriptif et ne prétend en aucun cas être 
causal". Why are linguists allowed to adopt such an epistemological stance 
toward their object? Could such disclaimers be used in mechanics, nuclear 
physics, medicine, etc.? Probably not. A “wrong” linguistic rule has no 
consequence whatsoever. It will never make a plane crash or kill human 
beings. Apart from conflicts resulting from differences in theoretical 
approaches, it is clear that nothing crucial is at stake in linguistics. But should 
this state of affairs allow us to proceed like Calvin and project our own 
theoretical conceptions onto language without ever questioning the 
legitimacy of such an epistemological position? No. 
No matter what, it would probably be better to make the map conform to the 
yard… 
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